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Abstract 
The purpose of this project was to show how climate change is transforming geopolitics 
in the Arctic by creating new economic opportunities leading to the increased 
militarization of Arctic nations. This thesis triangulates the current Arctic policy of 
member nations, economic resources and opportunities in the region, and the increased 
military presence in the region to demonstrate how a potential conflict may occur in the 
region if the current trend continues. This thesis aims to show how resource greed over 
non-contiguous territory and an increased military presence escalated tensions in the 
Arctic. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 The Arctic has played a substantial role in international politics. During the Cold 
War, the Arctic was a significant source of tension between the United States and Russia. 
In the post Cold War era, disputes over the Arctic subsided and steps were taken to create 
peace and cooperation in the region. In recent years, climate change has threatened to 
disrupt the current cooperative manner in the Arctic amongst the Arctic nations. The 
Arctic nations are Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, 
Denmark, and Finland. 
 Below the ice, the Arctic contains vast reserves of oil and natural gas. The melting 
ice allows for easier access to these natural resources as well as shipping routes that were 
formerly impassable due to year round ice coverage. The Arctic region contains many 
overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones from the surrounding countries. Now that the ice 
is melting, countries are trying to lay claims over what they propose to be their territory 
in order to gain unobstructed access to the resources and/or shipping routes. 
 As a result of growing tensions over economic opportunities, the Arctic countries 
are beginning to revamp and increase their Arctic military capabilities and presence. This 
thesis aims to analyze how resource greed over non-contiguous territories and an 
increased military presence may lead to a potential conflict in the Arctic.  
For this thesis, it is important to note that the term conflict is fluid on the conflict 
continuum. It is likely that any conflict in the Arctic will not escalate past an unarmed 
standoff or unarmed mid-level dispute. The term conflict is fluid because where it lands 
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on the continuum is dependent on future decisions made, or not made, by the 
involved governments.  
Climate Change 
Climate change is affecting the Arctic almost twice as fast as any other region on 
the planet. Climate change is defined by NASA as “a change in the typical or average 
weather of a region or city.”1 Over the last century, Earth’s average surface temperature 
has risen nearly 1.62 degrees Fahrenheit.2 Carbon dioxide levels are at the highest they 
have been in 650,000 years and while it is not atypical for the Earth to experience 
fluctuations in carbon dioxide levels, the rate at which they are increasing is what is of 
concern. Much of the increase in the carbon dioxide levels has been attributed to human-
related causes such as the release of greenhouse gases.3 As a result, Earth’s temperature is 
predicted to continue to rise over the next hundred years anywhere from 0.5 º to 8.6 º 
Fahrenheit.4 The warming of the earth, referred to as global warming, is problematic 
because even a slight shift in Earth’s temperature can cause catastrophic changes in 
climate and weather.  
 In the Arctic, sea ice reaches its minimum coverage every year during the month 
of September. According to NASA, sea ice in the Arctic is declining by 12.8% per 
                                                   
1 Sandra May, ed., “What Are Climate and Climate Change?,” NASA (NASA, October 
26, 2011), https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/5-8/features/nasa-knows/what-is-
climate-change-58.html. 
2 “Climate Change Evidence: How Do We Know?,” NASA (NASA), accessed March 3, 
2019, https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/. 
3 Ibid. 
4 “Future of Climate Change,” EPA (Environmental Protection Agency, December 27, 
2016), https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climate-change-science/future-climate-
change_.html. 
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decade, according to the calculated average between 1989-2010.5 Figure 1 shows a 
NASA graph of the annual sea ice minimum in the Arctic. NASA projects the the Arctic 
will be ice free during the summer months by 2050.6 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Average September Extent of Sea Ice (Graph by NASA/NSIDC)7 
 
For this thesis, it is important to understand what climate change is and how it is 
affecting the Arctic. This thesis analyzes how climate change is transforming the 
geographic landscape of the Arctic Circle leading to the increased exposure of natural 
resources, such as oil and natural gas, that can potentially be exploited for economic 
benefit. As the potential for economic exploitation increases and the natural boundaries 
                                                   
5 “Arctic Sea Ice Minimum | NASA Global Climate Change,” NASA (NASA, October 
10, 2018), https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/arctic-sea-ice/. 
6 NASA, https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/. 
7 NASA, https://climate.nasa.gov. 
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provided by the ice cap melts, Arctic nations are expanding and modernizing their 
military presence, capabilities, and equipment, such as weapons, aircraft, and vehicles, 
for use in Arctic conditions.  
An entire region is melting into an ocean and the natural boundaries it once 
provided are melting with it. The eight countries that border or have territory in the Arctic 
are left to deal with the newfound access to resources and a lack of border security. As a 
result, tensions in the region are rising. While the current trend is to continue cooperation 
amongst the nations, Canada, Russia, and the United States, along with the five other 
nations, have started to implement their plans to protect their borders and economic 
zones. It is important to note that the ongoing situation in the Arctic is the first time in 
modern history that an entire land mass could potentially disappear. The goal of this 
thesis is not to predict what will happen in the future but to assess the likelihood of Arctic 
countries to continue cooperation or engage in conflict by analyzing the current stated 
goals of said countries and their actual actions. I hypothesize that, based on the current 
situation, cooperation in the Arctic will begin to deteriorate due to the growing potential 
for resource exploitation and an open ocean unless efforts are made to create a stronger 
security community in the Arctic. Before these competing ideas can be analyzed, it is 
important to create an understanding of the existing literature on the subject.  
Existing Scholarship and Literature Review 
 Existing scholarship explores the increased interest in potential economic 
expansion in the Arctic as well as Arctic countries expanding and modernizing their 
Arctic military capabilities. It also analyzes the argument of continued cooperation verses 
future conflict. Much scholarship exists on the Arctic region and the relationships 
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between Arctic countries. Most of the existing scholarship on the Arctic explores the 
environmental impact of climate change, military and security capabilities of Arctic 
states, and future resource exploitation. There is also extensive literature on the causal 
relationship of resources on human conflict. However, while the empirical literature on 
the Arctic is growing, there is comparatively little scholarship on the cooperation and 
conflict argument in the Arctic. The scholarship that does exist typically compares two 
countries and their Arctic policies as well as their increased military expansion. Much of 
the existing scholarship also differs in its concluding views over whether the Arctic is 
headed towards continued cooperation or future conflict. This thesis will begin to fill this 
gap by expanding on, analyzing, and combining the existing literature on the relationship 
of cooperation and conflict between Russian, Canada, and the United States, as well as 
the Arctic countries and NATO, in one paper.  
 In the book, The European Union and the Arctic, multiple scholars contribute to 
create an in-depth look at how the European Union can shape the future Arctic. While 
this does not directly align with my thesis, two of the chapters are important for creating 
a base of understanding in my thesis. In Chapter seven, “Russian Arctic Policy, 
Petroleum Resources Development and the EU: Cooperation or Coming Confrontation?”, 
Tina Hunter explains how the high quantity of Arctic resources is “giving rise to a 
perception of intense competition for petroleum resources in the Arctic.”8 She details the 
competing views in the literature between Russia continuing cooperation and Russia 
building up its military as a sign of aggression. She determines by comparing policy and 
                                                   
8 Tina Hunter, “Russian Arctic Policy, Petroleum Resources Development and the EU: 
Cooperation or Coming Confrontation?,” essay, in ,The European Union and the Arctic, 
ed. Nengye Liu, Elizabeth A Kirk, and Tore Henrikson (Brill, 2017), pp. 172-199, 173. 
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action that “there is commonality of Arctic policy interests between Russia and the EU, 
which appear to be ushering in an era of cooperation, not conflict and the threat of war.”9 
For this thesis, this chapter creates a solid base of research on Russian Arctic policy and 
military build up in relation to how this affects Russia’s relations with other Arctic states.  
 In Chapter six, “Searching for Common Ground in Evolving Canadian and EU 
Arctic Strategies”, P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Suzanne Lalonde explore the 
impressions of an aggressive Canadian Arctic policy.10 They state that “Canada’s 
propensity to project its domestic northern strategy, which is deeply embedded in North 
American Arctic priorities, into the circumpolar sphere should come as no surprise owing 
to its success in deeply institutionalizing its concept of the Arctic in current instruments 
of Arctic governance.”11 Lackenbauer and Lalonde provide an important basis for 
Canada’s Arctic policy and its perception to Arctic states.  
 Klaus Dodds and Mark Nuttall’s book The Scramble for the Poles: Geopolitics of 
the Arctic and Antarctic, provides one of the more prominent bases of understanding the 
dichotomy of conflict and cooperation in the Arctic. They discuss how “a kind of 
extractive colonialism lives on”12 in the Arctic and is being accelerated by the growing 
accessibility to resources. They also say that even in situations with prior legal 
cooperation, the idea of a “land grab” creates political tension. They argue that Arctic 
                                                   
9 Ibid, 199. 
10 P Whitney Lackenbauer and Suzanne Lolande, “Searching for Common Ground in 
Evolving Canadian and EU Arctic Strategies,” essay, in The European Union and the 
Arctic, ed. Nengye Liu Liu, Elizabeth A Kirk, and Tore Henrikson (Brill, 2017), pp. 119-
171. 
11 Ibid, 122. 
12 Klaus Dodds and Mark Nuttall, ,The Scramble for the Poles: the Geopolitics of the 
Arctic and Antarctic(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 21. 
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states are using scientific exploration and the quest for knowledge to enable them to 
shape “sovereign power and national projects designed to bolster sovereignty and 
security”.13 Klaus and Dodds note that unlike in the Antarctic, states in Arctic opted to 
maintain sovereignty under their UNCLOS rights. They conclude that the situation may 
echo the past where the Arctic was divided into “the Soviet Arctic and the Western 
Arctic.”14 
 In his piece, Breaking the Ice: Potential US-Russian Maritime Conflict in the 
Arctic”, Mate Aerandir details the potential for conflict in the Arctic by looking at the 
United States and Russia. He includes sections on how resource greed and competing 
territorial claims increase the chance of a conflict in the Arctic. His work provided 
excellent information and background into the complicated territorial disputes in the 
Arctic. 
 
Purpose and Methodology 
 My review of the existing literature provides of foundation of the contending 
conclusions and analyses about cooperation in the Arctic. Besides differing conclusions 
in the existing literature, the stated policies of the Arctic countries contend with their 
recent plans and implementations to strengthen and modernize their Arctic military 
capabilities. This is the first time in modern history that an entire region of the planet may 
potentially disappear. The current trend towards cooperation is based off the existence of 
Arctic sea ice and the natural boundaries it provides. This thesis does not aim to predict 
                                                   
13 Ibid, 22.  
14 Ibid, 107. 
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whether a major armed conflict will ensue in the Arctic region since the ever-changing 
nature of the Arctic renders predictions impractical. Instead, this thesis aims to analyze 
the current situation and assess whether the trend towards cooperation is likely to 
continue. As stated earlier, I hypothesize that, based on the current situation, cooperation 
will deteriorate due to the lack of a unified security community in the region.  
In order to show how cooperation will deteriorate, I will use the triangulation of 
three methods. I examine and analyze the official Arctic policies of Canada, Russia, and 
the United States along with NATO. I then analyze the potential for resource exploitation 
and the economic benefits of an open ocean in the Arctic. Then, I examine how Canada, 
Russia, and the United States are modernizing and strengthening their military 
capabilities and equipment for use in the Arctic. By analyzing these three components, in 
addition to the existing literature, it becomes more apparent that even though cooperation 
is an important aspect of active Arctic policy, the actions from the Arctic states do not 
align with the trend of cooperation. Furthermore, the lack of a unified security 
community in the Arctic coupled with each nation’s emphasis on sovereignty hints 
towards rising tensions amongst the nations.  
By triangulating these components with the potential for economic benefit, it 
becomes apparent that access to defined Exclusive Economic Zones is a major factor for 
maintaining sovereignty in the Arctic. Due to ongoing boundary disputes and formal 
requests for extensions of these zones, the Arctic nations are preparing for resource 
exploitation and control of shipping routes in their respective territories. The military 
build up of the Arctic nations is in part to increase infrastructure to uphold potential 
economic endeavors. In the past year, however, Arctic military exercises and a 
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heightened military presence point to the expansion of Arctic capabilities to practice for 
Arctic conflicts.  
In this thesis, I will also include case studies. The first case study shows how 
resource greed over non-contiguous territories can lead to mid-level disputes as seen in 
the South China Sea. The following two case studies show how cooperation in the Arctic 
has already started to deteriorate by looking at specific situations.. The purpose of these 
case studies is to show how this is occurring on a micro level compared to looking at the 
Arctic as a generalized region.  
By using triangulation and including case studies, this thesis analyzes the 
likelihood of continued cooperation through cross-examination of multiple components 
as well as on a macro and micro level.  
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Chapter 2: Treaties, Doctrines, and Policies in the Arctic 
Climate change is affecting the Arctic faster than any other region of the world. 
The rapidly melting ice is creating new challenges and raising new questions over how to 
handle the future changes. Eight countries hold claims in the Arctic region. The focus of 
this thesis is how three of these countries, Russia, Canada, and the United States, are 
dealing with a changing geographic landscape in the Arctic and the new economic 
opportunities and military tensions that are arising as a result. In order to understand the 
complex environment, both physically and politically, that is the Arctic it is important to 
know the current political landscape these countries have created in the region. The 
purpose of this chapter is to explain and examine the policy goals of Russia, Canada, and 
the United States and how those policies affect affect security initiatives in the Arctic.  
The Arctic Council 
 In 1996, the eight countries with territorial claims in the Arctic Circle founded the 
Arctic Council under the Ottawa Declaration. The Arctic Council is the only joint action 
between all Arctic nations. The Arctic Council is comprised of the eight member 
countries, six permanent participants, and 13 observers. The eight member countries are 
Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Canada, Russia and the United States.15 
The permanent participants are indigenous peoples’ organizations comprised of 
indigenous groups who live in the Arctic and the 13 observers are non-territory holding 
                                                   
15 “Ministerial Meeting,” Arctic Council, July 6, 2015, https://arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/member-states. 
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countries who were granted observer status.16 The work of the Council is carried out by 
six working groups with the overall goal of is to facilitate “cooperation, coordination and 
interaction among the Arctic States, Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic 
inhabitants on common Arctic issues.”17 The main issues the Council deals with are 
environmental concerns, conservation, scientific research, and sustainable development.18 
The mandate of the council cannot implement or enforce anything as that is the 
responsibility of each Arctic state. The mandate also excludes military and security 
issues.19 There is no joint military or security doctrine between the eight Arctic nations.  
Russia Arctic Policy 
 Russia has an extensive history of policy in the Arctic dating back to the Soviet 
Union. For the purposes of this thesis, I will only focus on policies released after Putin’s 
rise to presidency. In 2001, Russia released the “Basics of the Russian Federation State 
Policy in the Arctic.” The document declares that all Arctic related tasks should be 
carried out with the defense and security of the region to the utmost degree.20 Seven years 
later, in 2008, Russia replaced the 2001 document with the “Foundations of the State 
Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period until 2020 and Beyond.” It is 
the most relevant and important Arctic strategy for Russia to date. It serves as an agenda 
for Russia’s Arctic goals, plans the implementation of state policy, and calls for a build 
                                                   
16 “Permanant Particpants,” Arctic Council, July 6, 2015, https://arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants. 
17 “About Us,” Arctic Council, May 20, 2015, https://arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us. 
18 “Working Groups,” Arctic Council, June 29, 2015, https://arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups. 
19 About Us, Arctic Council. 
20 VArt, “Osnovy Gosudarstvennoy Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii v Arktike,” Practical 
science , June 14, 2001, http://www.sci.aha.ru/econ/A111c.htm. 
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up and continued modernization of the military to protect its national security and north 
border.21 The main difference in the 2008 policy from the 2001 version is its emphasis on 
cooperation. It emphasizes the importance of maintaining the Arctic as a region of 
cooperation. It also states that Arctic is simultaneously a “sphere of military security” and 
a “zone of cooperation.”22 Russia further elaborated on the 2008 document with the 
“Development Strategy of the Russian Arctic and the Provision of National Security for 
the Period until 2020.” It lists the additional priority of establishing an integrated security 
system. It also further details plans to increase army, navy, and air force presence in the 
region as well as modernizing their military equipment and weapons.23 
 In 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed into the new Military Doctrine. 
A military doctrine details a nation’s goals when it comes to the defense of nation and are 
typically made public. This doctrine updated the countries 2010 military doctrine. Two of 
the biggest differences between the 2010  and the 2014 version are how Russia talks 
about NATO and the inclusion of the Arctic. In terms of NATO, the 2014 doctrine differs 
from the earlier version by describing NATO’s actions as ongoing threats and dangers as 
opposed to potential ventures.24 It is important to note that 2014 is the same year NATO 
suspended cooperation with Russia due to its involvement in Ukraine. Russia released its 
                                                   
21 “Osnovy Gosudarstvennoy Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii v Arktike Na Period Do 2020 
Goda I Dal'neyshuyu Perspektivu,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 27, 
2009), https://rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html. 
22 Ibid 
23 “O Strategii Razvitiya Arkticheskoy Zony Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Obespecheniya 
Natsional'noy Bezopasnosti Na Period Do 2020 Goda,” Правительство России 
(Pravitel'stvo Rossii, February 20, 2013), http://government.ru/info/18360/. 
24 Oliker and Olga, “Russia's New Military Doctrine: Same as the Old Doctrine, Mostly,” 
RAND Corporation, January 15, 2015, https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/01/russias-
new-military-doctrine-same-as-the-old-doctrine.html. 
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updated military doctrine after the fall out with NATO. The other main difference in the 
2014 doctrine is the inclusion of the Arctic. The Doctrine urges the importance of 
protecting interests in the area, even during peacetime.25 Russia’s current policies in the 
Arctic urge for the protection of national interests, lay plans for the continued build up 
and modernization of their military capabilities in the Arctic, and state the interests of 
maintaining peace in the region. 
Canada Arctic Policy  
In 2009, Canada launched its “Northern Strategy” plan. They state that the 
ultimate vision for the Arctic is a “stable, rules-based region, with clearly defined 
boundaries, dynamic economic growth and trade, vibrant Northern communities, and 
healthy and productive ecosystems.”26 The strategy lists four pillars that are considered to 
be the most important to Canada. The four pillars are exercising sovereignty, promoting 
economic and social development, protecting the environment, and empowering the 
peoples of the North. Canada makes clear that the most important pillar is their ability to 
continue exercising sovereignty in the region. The strategy details that in order to 
exercise their sovereignty, Canada will continue to practice responsible stewardship and 
good governance, solve boundary issues, and increase their military capabilities to better 
                                                   
25 “Russia's Arctic Strategy: Military and Security (Part II),” The Arctic Institute, January 
22, 2019, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-arctic-military-and-security-part-
two/. 
26Global Affairs Canada, Foreign Affairs, and E-Communications Communications 
Products, “Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy,” GAC, May 12, 2017, 
https://international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-
relations_internationales/arctic-arctique/arctic_policy-canada-
politique_arctique.aspx?lang=eng. 
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patrol their lands and waters in the Arctic as well as to keep pace with the rest of the 
world.27  
Canada aims to resolve their boundary dispute with Denmark in accordance with 
international law. They also want to “secure international recognition for the full extent 
of our extended continental shelf wherein we can exercise our sovereign rights over the 
resources of the seabed and subsoil.” In the following chapter, I will discuss the current 
territorial disputes and overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones. Canada also details the 
plans for their “Canada First Defence Strategy.” This defence plan calls for the delivery 
of a new icebreaker, expands the size of Canadian Rangers, and increases Canada’s 
military presence in the Arctic. The full extent of Canada’s Arctic military capabilities 
will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
United States Arctic Policy 
  The United States has several Arctic policy initiatives from different facets of the 
government. In 2009, “National Security Directive 66 (NSPD-66)” was published. It 
states the policy of the United States is to meet national security and homeland security 
needs, protect the Arctic environment, and sustainable development among several other 
things.28 In 2013, Obama released the “National Strategy for the Arctic Region.” It 
advances US security interests, pursues responsible stewardship and strengthens 
                                                   
27Ibid. 
28 “National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive” NSPD-66 on Arctic Region Policy (The White House, January 9, 2009), 
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm. 
 
 15 
cooperation amongst member states.29 The last policy initiative of the US government is 
the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Report to “Congress on  Strategy to Protect United 
States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region” 
as of 2016. It takes a more militaristic approach as it is coming from a defense agency. Its 
main goals are enhancing US capabilities to defend Alaska, strengthen deference and 
alliances, preserve freedom of the seas, and evolve DoD infrastructure in the Arctic.30 
According the State Departments Arctic website, the main goals of all Arctic policy are 
as follows: meet national security needs, protect the environment, strengthen cooperation 
among the Arctic nations, involve indigenous communities, and enhance scientific 
research in the region.31 
 
NATO Arctic Policy 
In this thesis, it is important to understand the role NATO plays in the Arctic. 
This thesis specifically looks at the United States, Russia, Canada as they are three of the 
biggest players globally and in the Arctic. These countries are also involved in the most 
territorial disputes compared to the rest of the Arctic nations. However, NATO plays a 
large role in the event of a possible conflict in the Arctic. Of the eight Arctic nations, five 
are NATO members. The six members are Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and the 
                                                   
29 “National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” Obama White House Archives (White 
House, May 10, 2013). 
30 “Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in 
the Arctic Region,” Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National 
Security Interests in the Arctic Region § (n.d.), pp. 1-17. 
31 “Arctic Sea Ice Minimum | NASA Global Climate Change,” U.S. Department of State 
(U.S. Department of State), accessed March 15, 2019, 
https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/. 
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United States. Sweden and Finland are not NATO members but considered as allied 
nations. Russia is the only country not affiliated with NATO.  
 If a conflict were to erupt in the Arctic, NATO members would likely respond in 
support of the NATO allied nation. In the report, NATO cited concerns over the impact 
of climate change on Arctic security. NATO stated that “there is a desire among Arctic 
countries to cooperate closely to address common challenges and solve territorial 
disputes by diplomatic means.”32 However, they also noted concerns that outside NATO-
Russia relations could spill over into the Arctic. They stressed that while members have 
conflicting views over Russia’s military intentions in the region that all the members 
agreed that Arctic security is a priority. The report ends with a plan to “continue and 
strengthen Allied exercises on the Alliance’s northern flank.”33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
32 Gerald E Connolly, “NATO and Security in the Arctic ,” rep., NATO and Security in 
the Arctic (NATO, 2017), pp. 1-11. 
33 Ibid. 
 17 
Chapter 3: Competing Claims and Territorial Disputes 
 
When discussing the Arctic, it is important to understand the complex territorial 
claims and disputes in the region. Currently, the United Nations on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) serves as the primary international law related to the rights and 
responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of oceans. By following UNCLOS 
procedures, countries can claim territories that are recognized under the international 
treaty. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
“Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and exercise 
jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection.”34 In other 
words, a country has sole access to the natural resources within their EEZ. Figure 2 
shows the current EEZs of countries with claims in the Arctic. Since many of the EEZs 
overlapped, several countries mutually agreed upon offshore boundaries. As you can also 
see in Figure 2, the region beyond the 200-nautical mile limit is currently under 
competing claims from multiple countries. In accordance with the UN, countries had 10 
years after ratifying UNCLOS to make a claim for an extended continental shelf.35 The 
                                                   
34  “Overview - Convention & Related Agreements,” United Nations (United Nations), 
accessed March 17, 2019, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.ht
m. 
35 Ibid. 
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claims are to be submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
where they will be validated by an independent committee.36  Extended continental 
shelves (ECS) can extend beyond the 200-nautical mile marker. An ECS does not extend 
a country’s EEZ but it does have distinct sovereign rights over their ECS including 
exploration and exploitation of the seabed and subsoil.37  
 
Figure 2. Overlapping EEZs in the Arctic38 
The United States is yet to ratify UNCLOS meaning that they are unable to make 
a claim for an extended continental shelf. They do accept UNCLOS as international 
                                                   
36 “CLCS - HOME PAGE,” United Nations (United Nations), accessed March 23, 2019, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm. 
37 “Arctic FAQ,” U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State, n.d.), 
https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/ecs/faq/index.htm. 
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law.39 Russia was the first country to ratify UNCLOS in 1997. This gave them until 2007 
to make an ECS claim. In 2001, Russia submitted an official submission to UN 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf through UNCLOS. It proposed to 
establish the outer limits of Russia’s shelf beyond the limits of the EEZ but within the 
Arctic sector. The Commission neither accepted nor denied Russia’s claim and 
recommended additional research.40 In 2007, Russia funded an expedition known as 
Arktika 2007 in order to collect more information for their extended shelf claim.41 By 
2015, Russia officially filed its additional data to the UN. Russia is claiming 1.2 million 
square kilometers which extends more than 650 kilometers from the shore.42 The UN 
began working on this claim in August 2016.  
Canada ratified UNCLOS in November 2003. That same year, they launched an 
exploration to determine the outer limits of its continental shelf in the Arctic and Atlantic 
Ocean. On December 6th, 2013, Canada submitted a claim to the Commission. This 
claim provided information about its extended shelf and fell within the 10 year limit of 
becoming a party of UNCLOS. The 2013 submission was only a partial submission and 
Canada is currently preparing the remaining part of its study. The area Canada is 
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examining begins 200 nautical miles offshore from its Arctic shoreline.43 The area 
extends from Canada Basin to the Lomonosov Ridge north of Ellesmere Island and 
Greenland, and beyond the North Pole.44 The region covers nearly 750,000 square 
kilometers. 
According to Mate Aerandir, in his work “Breaking the Ice: Potential US-Russian 
Maritime Conflict in the Arctic,” there are five heavily disputed areas in the Arctic. There 
five areas include the Lomonosov Ridge, the Bering Strait, the Beaufort Sea, the 
Northwest Passage, and Hans Island.45 Aerandir states that each “has the potential to lead 
to some level of conflict if not resolved peacefully through existing mechanisms or 
otherwise binding agreements.”46 The Lomonsov Ridge is disputed by Russia, Canada, 
and Denmark, the Bering Strait by Russia and the United States , the Beaufort Sea by 
Canada and the US, the Northwest Passage by Canada and the US, and Hans Island by 
Canada and Denmark. This thesis will analyze three of the five disputed areas. This thesis 
will not analyze the Hans Island dispute between Canada and Denmark because the two 
countries are currently working together to peacefully resolve the dispute. Russia, Canada 
and the United States are involved in all of the five highly contested territorial disputes. It 
is important to understand the complex territorial claims and disputes in the Arctic 
because it signifies specific areas where a potential dispute may occur. As I will detail in 
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the following chapters, resource exploitation and control over shipping lanes is a factor in 
the territorial disputes. The economic benefits stood to gain from controlling these 
territories is a major component in the respective countries’ decision to try to claim 
sovereignty. 
Economic Opportunities 
Oil and Natural Gas 
The receding ice in the Arctic presents nations with a plethora of economic 
opportunities. Arctic nations are under increasing pressure to claim and solve territorial 
disputes that were formally frozen or insignificant. The current situation creates 
uncertainty over legal territories for businesses and companies to begin developing 
economic ventures. Whether the countries decide to utilize the resources available to 
them or claim shipping routes to turn a profit, they first must receive approval over their 
territorial claims. This section will analyze the economic opportunities present in the 
Arctic and those present in the disputed territories.  
The Arctic Circle comprises approximately 6 percent of Earth’s surface or the 
equivalent of 21 million km2. Around 8 million km2 of this surface area is onshore and 
more than 7 million km2 is on continental shelves with a depth of less than 500m.47 The 
Arctic continental shelves are thought to have the largest unexplored petroleum reserves 
on Earth. . In Canada, Russia, and Alaska, exploration has already occurred in several 
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onshore areas. These explorations resulted in the discovery of more than 400 oil and gas 
fields north of the Arctic Circle. These discovered fields hold approximately 240 billion 
barrels of oil or oil-equivalent natural gas.48 This equates to nearly 10% of the world’s 
known petroleum resources.49 Despite the discoveries in Canada, Russia, and Alaska, the 
amount of petroleum in the Arctic was relatively unknown until 2008. 
In May 2008, a team of scientists from the United States Geological Survey 
completed an appraisal of potential oil and gas reserves from newly discovered fields 
North of the Arctic Circle. The Arctic Circle is anything north of 66.56° latitude. This 
appraisal is known as the Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal, or CARA. The CARA 
evaluated fields that were thought to have at least a 10 percent chance of having one or 
more sources of gas or oil accumulation. In this study, a significant accumulation is 
recoverable volumes of at least 50 million barrels of oil or oil-equivalent natural gas.50 
Figure 3 shows the color-coded probability of the presence of at least one undiscovered 
oil or gas field. This study only evaluated the resources thought to be recoverable using 
existing technologies but it does include offshore areas under the assumption that 
resources would be recoverable despite the presence of sea ice and water depth.  
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Figure 3. Probability of Presence of Oil or Gas Field51 
 
The CARA team determined 33 provinces thought to contain petroleum reserves. 
The provinces are listed in Table 1 where they are ranked in order of the amount of 
estimated undiscovered oil, gas, and natural gas liquids (in oil-equivalent volumes). Of 
the 33, 8 were found to have less than 10 percent probability of a significant 
accumulation in any AU so they were not quantitatively measured. Table 1 shows the 
probabilistic results of the amounts of oil and gas found in the Arctic by province. The 
                                                   
51 Ibid. 
 24 
CARA assessed that 70 percent of the mean undiscovered oil is thought to occur in five 
provinces: Arctic Alaska, Amerasia Basin, East Greenland Rift Basins, East Barents 
Basins, and West Greenland –East Canada.52 For undiscovered natural gas, more than 70 
percent is estimated to occur in three provinces: West Siberian Basin, East Barents Basin, 
and Arctic Alaska.53 The CARA team also estimated that around 84 percent of the 
undiscovered oil and gas occurs offshore. In total, the CARA team estimates that “the 
total mean of undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources of the Arctic are estimated 
to be approximately 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 
44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids.”54 Until claims are finalized and an agreement is 
reached, will either have to cooperate or extract resources without the other nation’s 
permission which could lead to a dispute.  
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Table 1. Summary of the CARA55 
In the Lomonosov Ridge, there are three basins relatively near each other: 
Amerasia Basin, Eurasia Basin, and the Lomonosov-Makarov Basin. Russia, Greenland, 
and Canada have all included the ridge in their ECS claims. According to the USGS 
CARA survey, the three basins near the Lomonosov Ridge equate to 12,172.51 MMBO 
(million barrels of oil)  and 27,346.49 MMBOE (million barrels of oil and oil equivalent 
                                                   
55 Ibid. 
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natural gas.56 For reference, the average price for a barrel of crude oil from three 
important benchmark oil prices: UK Brent, West Texas Intermediate, and OPEC Basket. 
The average 2017 price between these three benchmarks was $52.48.57 The potential 
gross profit for oil and gas in the Lomonosov Ridge area using the average 2017 price is 
equivalent to $1.435 trillion.  If any of these countries are awarded a territorial claim to 
the Lomonosov Ridge, they have the right to explore and exploit resources in the seabed 
and subsoil which includes drilling for oil and gas. Before a claim is awarded, the three 
countries risk instigating a dispute if they do not receive consent from the other countries 
to begin resource exploitation.  
Shipping Routes 
The Arctic is home to several prominent shipping lanes and passage routes for 
ships. Most of these routes are unusable due to the fact that they are covered in ice for the 
majority, if not the entirety, of the year. However, as sea ice is starting to melt the 
prospect of using two of these routes has become more feasible. The two most prominent 
routes are known as The Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route.  
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          The Northwest Passage runs from the Atlantic Ocean to the Bering Strait right 
above Canada and Alaska.58 As you can see in Figure 4, the Northwest Passage has two 
potential routes around Victoria Island. The southern route goes under the island whereas 
the northern route goes above the island. The passage provides a shorter alternative 
compared to the Suez and Panama Canals. For example, going from London to Tokyo 
through the Northwest Passage is less than 8000 miles compared to 12,800 going through 
the Suez Canal.59 The passage also shortens the journey between New York and Shanghai 
via the Panama Canal by 3,000 miles.60 According to the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, the southern route has remained open throughout the 
summer since 2006.61 The northern route has remained open every year in the summer 
since 2007 except for 2013 and 2014.62 
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Figure 4. Northwest Passage 
 
Since 2007, around 30 ships have sailed the Northwest Passage each summer 
(Katie Peek). In 2013, the Nordic Onion carried a load of coal from Vancouver to Finland 
making it the first large bulk ship to transit the passage. The cargo ship Nunavik traversed 
the passage the next year without icebreaker assistance. The French ship the Crystal 
Serenity became the first large-scale cruise ship to make the passage during the summer 
of 2016.63 
The Northwest Passage is one of the contested territories between the United 
States and Canada. Canada has held sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago since 1880. 
They claim that due to their territorial holdings in the archipelago, the Northwest Passage 
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lies in their internal waters. This claim is contested by the United States and several 
European countries. In general, most countries contest Canada’s claim that the Northwest 
passage lies in their internal waters.  If the passage lies in international waters, it means 
that ships can freely pass. If Canada’s territorial claims over the passage are validated, 
Canada gains control over the majority of the passage. Canada has stated that if their 
claim is proven they will allow for free passage of ships as long as certain pollution 
standards are met. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNICLOS), “Coastal States exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea which they 
have the right to establish its breadth up to a limit not to exceed 12 nautical miles; foreign 
vessels are allowed ‘innocent passage’ through those waters.”64 The Convention also 
details that Archipelagic states may designate sea lanes that other states may use for 
passage between the islands. Even though the Northwest Passage will always be open for 
foreign ships due to the Convention, Canada’s territorial claims in the Arctic 
Archipelago, if they are validated, give them significant control regarding navigation 
regulations, pollution standards, and size of the passage usable for ships.65 
The Northern Sea Route is the other prominent shipping lane in the Arctic. The 
Northern Sea Route runs along the northern coast of Russia. The distance between 
Northern Europe to China is significantly shorter when utilizing the Northern Sea route 
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compared to other shipping routes. For example, it is 40% shorter compared to the Suez 
Canal and 60% shorter than the Cape of Good Hope.66 Figure 5 shows the differences 
between the distances in the Northern Sea Route and the Suez Canal. As the ice continues 
to melt, the use of this shipping lane becomes more viable for longer periods of time. In 
August 2017, the first ship traversed the passage without the use of icebreakers. If 
Russia’s claim through UNCLOS is proven, it gives them control over the Northern Sea 
Route. As with Canada, both countries must follow the rules outlined in UNCLOS 
regarding passage of foreign ships.  
 
Figure 5. Northern Sea Route 
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            Even though these shipping routes will always be open for free innocent passage 
regardless of the territory they fall in, if Russia and Canada’s claims are validated by the 
UN, it gives them a unique advantage. Their potential ability to control shipping 
regulations allows them to create or enforce rules that may not appeal to other countries.  
 The melting ice in the Arctic region is creating new economic opportunities in 
the Arctic. The vast amount of natural resources in the Arctic is an important discovery. 
As the ice continues to melt, the reality of harvesting those natural resources for use 
becomes more apparent. The current delineations for exclusive economic zones in the 
Arctic were mutually agreed upon by countries where they may be overlap. However, 
these borders are spoken agreements and rarely outlined in any type of definite policy. As 
the ice recedes, countries such as Canada, Russia, and the United States may decide to 
reclaim certain parts of their EEZs in order to protect their potential newfound resources 
in the Arctic. The economic benefit from harvesting the oil and natural gas in the Arctic 
is so great that the push to ensure exclusivity to these resources may turn the current 
peacefulness into a tense conflict. Furthermore, the shipping lanes in the Arctic are two of 
the fastest shipping routes in the world. Each year, the ice covers less area in the Arctic 
and for shorter periods of time. The elongated use of these shipping lanes is of great 
interest to the countries with claims over the shipping routes as well as countries with 
businesses who may benefit from the use of these new routes. Maintaining control of the 
shipping lanes gives countries the unique advantage of outlining the regulations for 
passing ships.  
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Case Study 
 To understand how resource greed over non-contiguous land disputes can lead to 
potential levels of conflict, it is important to look at similar situations occurring in other 
parts of the world. Below, I will analyze how conflicts in the South China Sea provide 
relevant, situational examples that demonstrate possible outcomes in the Arctic. 
South China Sea  
The South China Sea comprises an area of nearly 1.4 million square miles in the Pacific 
Ocean. It extends from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Taiwan.67 The most 
prominent and contested islands in the Sea include the Spratly Islands, the Paracel 
Islands, the Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and Scarborough Shoal. All six of the 
major Southeast nations lay claims to these islands. The six major nations involved in the 
dispute are China, Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines, and Indonesia.68 
Similar to the Arctic, the dispute is over more than just the land of islands themselves but 
also the EEZs and ECSs that give them rights to explore and exploit the ocean resources. 
The South China Sea is incredibly resource rich with a multitude of natural resources, 
fisheries, trade routes and also military bases.69 The World Bank states that the South 
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China Sea has proven oil reserves of nearly seven billion barrels and nearly 900 trillion 
cubic feet of natural gas.70 
 China is at the center of much of the tension as their nine-dash line gives them 
EEZ access to much of the South China Sea. As a result, all of the six countries have 
increased their militarization of the region. Recent points of contention include: a lengthy 
maritime standoff between China and the Philippines over intrusions into Scarborough 
Shoal in 2012; in 2013, the Philippines threatened to take China to a UN tribunal over 
violations of UNCLOS claims; and a Chinese drilling rig in the Paracel Islands led to 
multiple collisions between Chinese and Vietnamese ships in 2014.71 
 Even though these are all unarmed stand offs, they have the potential to escalate 
into something more. Countries such as the US have sent navy ships to the Philippines to 
escort trade ships in the event of a conflict.72 The South China Sea relates to the Arctic 
because it shows how resource greed over non-contiguous territorial claims can lead to 
stand-off disputes, increase militarization in the region, and escalate tensions.  
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Chapter 4: Military Capabilities in the Arctic and Increasing Military Tensions 
 
The previous chapter discussed potential economic opportunities developing as a 
result of the changing climate in the Arctic. In this chapter, I will explore how the 
receding sea ice is also changing the military landscape in the region. The Arctic ice cap 
reinforces the boundaries of Arctic countries. Klaus Dodds, a professor of geopolitics at 
Royal Holloway, explains that “The unique Arctic security architecture has shape and 
form that comes from natural extremities. If the Arctic becomes just another ocean, this 
breaks down.”73 The rapid disappearance of the ice exposes more open water for access 
and exploitation. NASA, along with many other climate change experts, predict that the 
Arctic will be completely ice free in the summer by 2050.74 The future breakdown of the 
Arctic ice boundaries coupled with the potential for economic exploitation provides 
greater incentives for countries to define their territorial claims in the Arctic. 
In order to prepare for a future open ocean in the Arctic, countries with territory in 
the region are strengthening or planning to strengthen their Arctic military capabilities. 
Russia, Canada, and the United States are among the countries who have recently 
revamped or laid out plans to revamp their military and military strategies. This chapter is 
split into two sections. The first section details the current military capabilities of Canada, 
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Russia, and the United States. This includes bases in the Arctic, weapons and 
weapon systems, ships and icebreakers suited for the Arctic as well as military exercises 
and soldiers trained for Arctic conditions. This section also looks at plans from the three 
countries to expand their capabilities, including new weapons and ships, plans to 
implement new strategies, and if they intend to increase their presence in the region.  
The second section of this chapter expands on the first section by examining how 
stronger Arctic militaries and an increased presence will affect cooperation amongst 
Arctic countries. As of now, the current trend in the region is to work on continuing and 
strengthening cooperation between the eight countries. I will continue to look specifically 
at the relationship between Canada, Russia, and the United States. However, I will also 
examine the overall relationship between the eight countries including rising tensions 
amongst several of them. This chapter aims to demonstrate how the rapidly shifting 
geographical landscape in the Arctic is causing tensions between invested countries to 
rise and incentivizing them to broaden their presence.  
  
Current and Planned Military Capabilities 
            Canada, Russia, and the United States have three of the strongest militaries in the 
world. In quantitative rankings from Credit Suisse and Global Fire Power, Canada is 
significantly lower down on the list, comparatively, but normally in the top 25 of the 
world’s strongest militaries. The United States and Russia are constantly ranked in the 
first and second spot, respectively.75 Despite, the overall military strength of these 
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countries, the Arctic terrain differs so greatly from the rest of the world that military 
strength and size does not apply in the same way. The Arctic ice cap and freezing 
temperatures render many of the traditional weapons, weapon systems, and transportation 
craft useless or unusable. As a result, the capabilities of these countries differs drastically 
in the Arctic compared to other regions of the world.  
In the Arctic, Russia has the most advanced and capable military. As discussed in 
the first chapter, Russia’s policy in the Arctic focuses primarily on non-military issues 
and maintaining cooperation. Two policy documents, Russian Military Doctrine (2014) 
and Maritime Doctrine (2015), do focus on protecting interests in the Arctic and maritime 
security concerns. To showcase the importance of Arctic military security, Russia has 
increased their already strong Arctic military capabilities. In December, 2014, Russia 
founded the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command, a new military district of the 
Russian armed forces, to include the Arctic region.76 Russia has also increased the 
training of its Arctic soldiers. One instance occurred in 2015 when Russia mobilized 
12,000 troops and 250 aircraft in the Arctic region in a snap exercise.77  
Russia’s air capabilities in the Arctic consist of the aircraft of the Northern Fleet. 
The majority of the aircraft do not have the range to fly beyond Russia’s territory with the 
exception of around 100 bomber and reconnaissance aircraft. Russia has reopened several 
air and radar bases that closed after the Cold War. They also have plans for open 10 radar 
bases and 13 air bases along the Arctic edge.78 On land, the Russian military is trained for 
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the winter of the Russian Arctic but not areas more towards the center of the Arctic ice 
cap. In 2011, Russia planned to mobilize two new infantry brigades with 3600 troops to 
the Arctic. The first brigade will be stationed on the Kola Peninsula and the second in 
Yakutia. The Russian military gains most of their Arctic strength from their Navy. The 
Northern Fleet (Arctic Fleet) is the largest of Russia’s five fleets. The Russian Navy has 1 
large icebreaker, 4 small ice breakers, 3 large armed icebreaking OPVs operated by the 
Border Guard, and over 20 civilian icebreakers that can be used by the Navy if needed. 
Most importantly, Russia’s Northern Fleet has most of Russia’s SSBNs, or ballistic 
missile submarines. They are protected by surface ships and nuclear-powered submarines 
and operate in the Arctic.79 Russia also has started production on a number of new 
icebreakers and SSBNs expected to be finished by 2020. A large number of Russia’s 
plans to build more submarines, aircraft carriers, and amphibious ships will not likely be 
realized due to budget issues. However, the Northern Fleet is rapidly expanding and the 
Russian military has the largest Arctic capable military in the world.   Figure 6 shows a 
map with the location of Russian Military bases and headquarters. 
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Figure 6. Russia’s Arctic Military Bases80 
In Canada, there has been a push in the last two decades to amplify their military 
capabilities in the Arctic. Under Justin Trudeau, he promised a renewed focus on the 
Arctic regions. The Royal Canadian Air Force operates a wide array of aircraft. Aircraft 
that is capable of flying in the Arctic includes 18 anti-submarine warfare, 77 combat 
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aircraft, and 8 transport aircraft (2 acquired and 6 being modernized).81 The Canadian 
Royal Air Force is currently trying to modernize much of its original fleet as well as 
acquire new aircraft. Canada also operates an extensive air surveillance radar network in 
the Arctic region. On land, the entire Canadian Army is cold weather trained and much of 
its equipment is useable in the Arctic temperatures. The Canadian Rangers is a lightly 
armed patrol and reconnaissance force trained for year round Arctic missions. The Army 
has a small base on Ellesmere Island and opened a new Arctic training center in Resolute 
Bay in 2013.
 
Canada’s 13 warships and 4 submarines cannot operate in the Arctic during 
the summer unless accompanied by an icebreaker. The Navy has no icebreakers or ice-
strengthened ships. The Coast Guard has 6 large icebreakers and 7 small ones but most of 
these can only break thin summer ice. The Canadian government keeps delaying plans to 
build more Arctic capable sea craft.  
The United States does not have one command in charge of the Arctic. Currently, 
the Northern Command, Pacific Command, and European Command share 
responsibilities in the Arctic.82 For the Air Force, they have two bases in Alaska that are 
near the Arctic: Eilson and Elmendorf. They house combat, support, interceptor and 
airborne early-warning aircraft.83 The Air Force also has use of the Thule base in 
Greenland and the Keflavik base in Iceland. 
On land, the US army has increased their Arctic training efforts. The army has 
two bases in Alaska, one near Anchorage and one near Fairbanks. The army also operates 
the Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory, the Cold Regions Test Center, 
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and the Northern Warfare Training Center.84 The entire US army completes their cold-
weather training at the Northern Warfare Training Center.85 The US Army Alaska 
(USARAK), self-dubbed themselves “America’s Arctic Warriors”.86 The unit is 
comprised of ordinary infantry and airborne troops. Despite their nickname, they are not 
specifically trained for Arctic military operations.87 The Alaska National Guard is the 
unit most likely to receive and carry out Arctic operations.  
Many of the US aircraft carriers, large combat ships and amphibious ships are 
usable in the Arctic under the right conditions. Nearly 51 of the US submarines are 
operable in the Arctic. They are capable of transit underneath and breaking through the 
ice.88 The Arctic Submarine Laboratory, under the command of the Pacific Fleet, is 
responsible for maintaining the submarine capabilities in the Arctic.89 
Russia, Canada, and the United States have military capabilities in the Arctic 
region. Russia’s military equipment and training capabilities surpass both the United 
States and Canada when it comes to the Arctic. In recent years, all three countries have 
increased their military proficiency as well as their presence in the Arctic. While it is 
highly unlikely an armed conflict will erupt in the Arctic, understanding each country’s 
military capabilities is important in determining the risks and levels of a possible dispute. 
The increasing amount of presence and capability in the region heightens tensions as each 
country aims to stay on par with the others.  
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Cooperation in the Arctic Moving Forward 
 The current trend amongst countries in the Arctic is to ensure that cooperation 
prevails. As discussed in the first chapter, Russia, Canada, and the United States each 
have their own unique Arctic policies. They all value and list security and military 
concerns yet remain clear that cooperation is imperative to their policy. These three 
countries, as well as the other five with claims in the Arctic, are very likely to continue to 
ensure cooperation but tensions amongst these countries will likely continue to grow at 
the same time. It is highly likely that armed conflict will not erupt in the Arctic. It is 
likely that an unarmed military standoff or show of power may occur if tensions continue 
to increase. This section analyzes the current state of cooperation in the Arctic, its 
weaknesses, and examples of past situations where Arctic militaries displayed their 
capabilities.   
 Eight countries hold territory in the Arctic. The eight countries are Norway, 
Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Russia, Canada, and the United States. Five of these 
countries are members of NATO: Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Canada and the United 
States.90 Sweden and Finland are not NATO members but have a long-standing 
partnership with the organization especially when it comes to monitoring and countering 
the military activities of Russia.91 Russia is the only country without a positive 
relationship to the alliance. In 2014, NATO suspended cooperation with Russia due to 
their involvement in Ukraine.92  
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 The Russian military’s weapons and weapons systems, equipment, and training 
abilities in the Arctic outweigh the capabilities of all the other countries combined. In 
2014, the same year relations deteriorated with NATO, Russia included the protection of 
Russian interests in the Arctic in its Military Doctrine. In correspondence with its effort 
to increase protections of Arctic interests, it founded the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic 
Command at the end of the same year. As of 2018, Russian troops were deployed to the 
Command. Russia has not had a set military base in the region or sole Arctic military 
operations since the Soviet area. The updated Arctic policy and opening of the command 
the same year that NATO relations deteriorated with Russia signifies their aim to increase 
their military presence in the region. 
 The Arctic region is of significance not only because of its potential economic 
endeavors but also the geographical proximity it provides. The distance from Russia to 
the United States and Canada is the shortest through the Arctic. Furthermore, the distance 
between any Arctic nation is closest if travelling across the Arctic. During the Cold War, 
the Arctic was important for the United States and Russia because it provides the shortest 
distance to reach the other country with aimed weapons.93 Russia’s remilitarization of the 
Arctic in recent years, has been perceived as a potential threat for North American and 
European security. 
 
Case Studies 
 The following two case studies show how Arctic nations are not only revamping 
their military capabilities but partaking in military exercises. The first military exercise, 
                                                   
93 Cathyrine T. R. Deja, “NATO's Future Role in the Arctic” (thesis, n.d.), pp. 1-14. 
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the Trident Junctures, was a joint a NATO force military exercise. The occurrence of the 
Trident Junctures and Russia’s response signifies that tensions in the Arctic are rising and 
countries are not afraid to flex their military force. The second military exercise, Vostok 
2018, is a reoccurring Russian military exercise. However, in 2018, Russia showcased 
their Arctic military capabilities. Both exercises occurred in the same year which likely 
signifies that the Arctic countries are preparing for future conflicts and stand offs. It also 
likely signifies that NATO aligned countries and Russia want to alert the other side of 
their readiness in the event of a future conflict. 
The Trident Junctures 
 In response to Russia’s expansion into the Arctic, NATO and allied countries, 
Finland and Sweden, participated in a military exercise called Trident Juncture. The event 
took place in 2018 from October 25th to November 7th.94 The exercises involved 51,000 
troops and multiple aircraft and vehicles. The exercise took place in Norway. Norway is 
the only NATO member with a long standing military presence in the Arctic region. 
Trident Juncture 2018 was NATO’s largest military exercise in years. The purpose was to 
test NATO’s ability “to plan and conduct major collective defensive operation under an 
Article 5 scenario.”95 An Article 5 scenario is a collective defense to an armed attack of 
one ally. NATO emphasized that these measures are preventative and not meant to 
provoke anyone. The Trident Junctures military exercise is significant because it portrays 
that Arctic countries believe they need to be trained and capable to respond to an Article 
5 scenario. While NATO regularly conducts joint military exercises amongst member 
                                                   
94 Nato, “Exercise Trident Juncture 2018,” NATO, accessed April 23, 2019, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/157833.htm#R7215060-0004A5Bf. 
95 Ibid. 
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nations, Trident Juncture was the first Arctic specific exercise since the Cold War. 
NATO’s decision to hold an Arctic based military exercise was not only to practice 
Article 5 scenarios but also to display their own readiness and capabilities in the event of 
conflict. 
The Russian Foreign Ministry responded back that the exercise were clearly 
“aggressively anti-Russian” and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said “NATO's military 
activities near our borders have reached the highest level since the Cold War.”96 
Furthermore, Russia scheduled missile testing off the coast of Norway from November 
1st through the 3rd to coincide with Trident Juncture. Russia followed normal protocols 
and procedures in notifying the proper channels of their planned tests.97 Russia continued 
to comment on the Trident Junctures at The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue 5th International 
Forum in April 2019. At the forum, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov commented 
on the “anti-Russian” Trident Junctures and accused NATO countries of wanting to 
replace the environment of cooperation with more militaristic attitudes. He stated that: 
I am hoping the spirit of the Arctic Council will prevail…we feel that some 
NATO countries would like to dispel this spirit and replace it with a militaristic 
attitude. I am convinced that our northern neighbors understand that such 
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approaches are dangerous and counterproductive and will not allow them 
to prevail.98 
The Trident Juncture and Russia’s response to it show how increasing tensions are 
beginning to lead to militaristic shows of power. All parties involved followed the proper 
procedures which signals that cooperation is still relevant. However, it also signals that 
both NATO and Russia want the other to know that they capable and prepared to take 
military action if ever necessary. These micro level disputes portray the increasing 
tensions in the area and how Arctic countries are responding with shows of military 
power.  
Vostok 2018 
Russia’s Vostok military exercises are part of the nation’s regularly scheduled 
events. It involves servicemen from all of Russia’s eastern and central military districts. 
Vostok 2018 involved 300,000 troops making it the largest Russian military exercise 
since the Soviet Union.99 The 2018 Vostok exercises included Arctic components. During 
the exercises, the Russian’s completed the first amphibious landing in the Arctic on the 
Coast of Chukotka.100 This signifies Russia is consistently working to improve their 
Arctic capabilities and remain the strongest single player in the region. 
                                                   
98 “Lavrov: Russia Hopes All Will Realize Military Activity in the Arctic Is 
Counterproductive,” Lavrov: Russia hopes all will realize military activity in the Arctic is 
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99 Nato, “VOSTOK 2018: Ten Years of Russian Strategic Exercises and Warfare 
Preparation,” NATO Review, accessed April 23, 2019, 
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/vostok-2018-ten-years-of-russian-
strategic-exercises-and-warfare-preparation-military-exercices/EN/index.htm. 
 
100 Levon Sevunts and Radio Canada International, “Russia Flexes Its Military Muscles 
with Arctic Component of Vostok 2018 War Games,” Eye on the Arctic, September 17, 
 46 
 
Rob Huebern, a senior research fellow at the Centre for Military and Strategic 
Studies, stated that the Russians included Arctic components for three reasons. He stated 
the first reason is because Russia is a hegemon in the Arctic and this allows them to show 
the international community how powerful they are in the region.101 The second is to 
send a message to Sweden and Finland to warn them against their historical neutrality 
with NATO.102 The third is: 
That they also have to be practicing to improve their capabilities in that region 
because it continues to be the centre of both their regional development – oil and 
gas, and shipping – as well as at the centre of their geopolitical doctrine and that 
of course is their nuclear deterrent.103 
The inclusion of Arctic drills in the Vostok 2018 exercises was both for practical and 
show of power reasons. As do most countries, Russia constantly works to improve or 
maintain their military capabilities, including in the Arctic. However, as Huebern stated, 
the inclusion of Arctic drills was also likely to send a message to other Arctic nations that 
Russia is incredibly capable, willing, and prepared in the event of a future conflict.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Russia, Canada, and the United States along with the NATO and other Arctic 
nations have stated their goal is to maintain cooperation in the Arctic. NATO and the US 
both want to keep the region an area of low tension. The current Arctic policies of Russia, 
Canada, and the United States simultaneously call for maintained cooperation and the 
right to protect their sovereignty. Cooperation is possible in the future as long as the 
sovereignty of each nation is not threatened. As detailed in the third chapter, the Arctic is 
a land of contested territories. Climate change is transforming the natural boundaries of 
the area. Areas that formally went unnoticed due to year-round ice coverage are now 
receiving more attention. As a result, the amount of contested areas in the region are 
beginning to grow and the resources they provide are more feasibly obtained. The Arctic 
nations will likely face growing tensions related to competing territorial claims and 
access to resources in those areas. The Arctic is a land of vast economic opportunity and 
countries such as Russia, Canada, and the United States are eager to bring new business 
ventures home to their citizens. 
The contested territorial claims and the possibility of a treasure cove of economic 
opportunities is causing the Arctic countries to amplify their military capabilities and 
presence in the region. The increased military presence can be seen by the new weapons, 
weapon systems, equipment, and presence of the Arctic military. Canada and the United 
States are working independently and with NATO to strengthen their military abilities in 
the Arctic. Russia, the long-time hegemon of the North, is alerting the international world 
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to their already obtained Arctic strength and showing them that they are only 
going to continue to grow. 
It is also important to note that the term conflict when applied to the Arctic is 
fluid on the continuum. The governments of the Arctic nation have the ability to move a 
conflict up or down the continuum based on the decisions they do or do not make. If the 
current situation maintains, it is unlikely that an armed conflict will erupt. However, 
increased tensions, unarmed military stand offs, military shows of power, and mid-level 
disputes are likely to occur in the Arctic. If the Arctic nations want to maintain 
cooperation in the region, proactive steps need to be taken in regards to border and 
resource agreements.  
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